DFRWS is dedicated to the sharing of knowledge and ideas about digital forensics research. Ever since it organized the first open workshop devoted to digital forensics in 2001, DFRWS continues to bring academics and practitioners together in an informal environment.
Introduction
The physical memory of a computer running Microsoft Windows 2000 or one of its descendants contains all metainformation necessary to manage the processes that are currently executed. As Chow, Pfaff, Garfinkel and Rosenblum showed, such meta-information in kernel memory can survive periods over 14 days and longer while the system is in use (Chow et al., 2005) . Despite its volatile nature kernel memory thus is a useful information source in a forensic examination. Several methods exist to dump the physical memory's contents to a file. Carrier and Grand (2004) provide a comprehensive description. On the Microsoft Windows platform there are two methods commonly used. Copying \\.\Device\Physical Memory to a file with the help of dd (Garner, 2004; Nicholas Harbour, 2005) is still very popular and recommended even in the newer literature (Brown, 2005, p. 223f.) . Main benefit of this method is the simple format of the resulting file: the file offset equals the absolute address in physical memory. For security reasons access to physical memory is barred from the userland from Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1 onwards (Microsoft Corporation, March 2005) .
Another popular method uses a documented registry key setting to cause a BugCheck trap on activation by a certain key sequence (Microsoft Corporation, August 2005) . The Bug-Check in turn causes the creation of a memory dump as configured in the system's settings. The main disadvantage of this method is the complex format of the resulting dump which might even leave out some pages of physical memory (Schuster, 2006a ). On the other hand only this format enables analysis with Microsoft's debuggers which are quite helpful when dealing with kernel data structures.
Related work
In 2005 three programs appeared which analyze full memory dumps of systems running Microsoft Windows. Mariusz Burdach described a procedure to enumerate processes and modules and implemented it in his Windows Memory Forensics Toolkit (Burdach, 2005) a tool which enumerates active processes and could also dump their process memory (Betz, 2005) . Kntlist by George M. Garner Jr. and Robert-Jan Mora evaluates several of the kernel's internal lists and tables to produce a huge list of processes, threads, handles and other objects (Garner and Mora, 2005) . These three programs are based upon the same principle. The Microsoft Windows kernel maintains tables and doublylinked lists in order to keep track of its resources. From a starting point, usually directed there by a global kernel variable, they walk such a list, enumerating all objects of a certain kind. At this these tools obviously are bound to two limitations.
First, they are likely to fail if some piece of malicious code unlinks an object from the list, thus hiding it from the API and all programs which walk the list on their own. This technique is well known under the name of Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM).
Second, these tools cannot show any object, which has reached the end of its lifespan and has been destructed. If a process terminates, the kernel will remove it from the list of processes and free its memory. Again the process will not be visible to a tool relying just on meta-data.
Idea
It was just pointed out that when an object is destructed the kernel will free its memory. But that does not mean the memory gets overwritten and reused immediately. So for a certain, yet undetermined time the original data representing the object might still be found in memory. Now the problem is to define a pattern which reliably identifies the objects. This article will describe the data structures representing processes and threads. It notes constant values and formulates rules which build upon pairs of offsets and values. Other rules will be derived from functional requirements of the operating system.
The procedure to identify process and thread objects will be a simple scanner. It advances through the whole dump file at a step width equal to the kernel's memory allocation granularity as it will be pointed out in Section 2.2.1. At every position the scanner assumes a valid process and thread structure, reads in a corresponding data portion and parses it.
The hypothesized object is then evaluated based on the rule set. Normally all constraints must be met. However, a forensic examiner might wish to lower the requirements, for example to catch also partially overwritten or concealed objects.
2.
Searching for processes and threads
Concepts
Microsoft Windows NT and its descendants are object oriented operating systems. So every resource meaningful to the operating system is represented as an object, consisting of data and methods to manipulate them. The kernel defines classes for processes and threads which then are heavily used by the scheduler and executive. Each of the kernel objects is preceded by an OBJECT_HEADER structure. This header refers to information about the object's type and also contains some reference counters. The OBJECT_ HEADER will be discussed in Section 2.2.2.
Processes and threads belong to a set of object classes which are special in that they can be waited for. Therefore this kind of objects is also called synchronizable. Waiting for an object will typically be done through a call to nt!KeWait ForSingleObject or a related function. All synchronizable objects share a common substructure, the DISPATCHER_ HEADER. As shown in Section 2.2.3 this header also contains some constants which will help to identify the object in memory.
Finally some memory is needed to actually store an object. The kernel maintains two heap-like sets of memory called pools. Most data will be kept in the paged pool whose contents may be swapped into a file if it should become necessary to reclaim physical memory. Only the most important and frequently accessed objects, process and thread objects among them, are kept in the non-paged pool and as such they will permanently reside in physical memory.
2.2.
Data structures
POOL_HEADER
Memory management of the Microsoft Windows NT kernel builds on functionality provided by the underlying hardware, which most commonly is Intel's IA-32 CPU architecture. According to this architecture memory is organized in pages of 4096 bytes. 1 For requests of memory smaller than or equal to the page size a part of the kernel called the Memory Manager will try to find a properly sized free region within the requested pool. Such small allocations will never extend across a page boundary. If no sufficient free space is available, the Memory Manager will claim another page of memory, add it to the proper pool and assign the requested amount of memory from that page.
Within a page the allocated blocks are loosely chained. Each block stores its own size and the size of the previous block. This allows to traverse the list of blocks in both directions.
Rule 1 There must be enough space preceding the current block to fit in the previous block.
Rule 2 From the start of the assumed block there must be enough space left in the current page to fit in the block.
Memory will be assigned in chunks of 32 bytes on Windows 2000 and 8 bytes on later versions. Therefore BlockSize and Pre-viousSize had to be extended to a width of 9 bits in transition from Windows 2000 to XP as shown in Fig. 1 .
Rule 3 The assumed POOL_HEADER structure has to be aligned on a 32 byte (for Windows 2000) or 8 byte boundary (later versions).
The PoolType is declared in the Microsoft Windows Driver Kit in the wdm.h and ntddk.h header files and documented in the Microsoft Developer Network (Microsoft Corporation, May 2005) . It has to be noted that the type code stored in the POOL_HEADER is incremented by 1. Hence a value of 0x00 marks a freed allocation.
Rule 4 PoolType must be either free or of a non-paged class, that is (PoolType
It is recommended to attach a tag of four ASCII characters to each memory request. The tag should be unique for each requester, e.g. a driver. A requester might use several tags to differentiate pool usage between its routines. The tag will be stored in the pool header. Tagging allows to track back memory leaks and pool corruption to the offending driver.
Process and thread objects will be created through a call to nt!ObpAllocateObject. This function allocates the required amount of memory by calling nt!ExAllocatePoolWithTag.
The pool tag will be taken from the proper OBJECT_TYPE structure, whereas the most significant bit will be set. As pool tags usually are limited to contain ASCII characters only, this might be an attempt to protect 2 tags of the operating system's objects from accidental use by third-party code. The keys for process and thread objects are ''Proc'' and ''Thre'', hence the ''protected'' tags are: Rule 5 PoolTag ¼ ¼ 0xe36f7250 for processes. This rule does not apply to the Idle process.
Rule 6 PoolTag ¼ ¼ 0xe5726854 for threads. This rule does not apply to the Idle thread.
OBJECT_HEADER
Each of the kernel's objects is prefixed by an OBJECT_HEADER as shown in Fig. 2 . Type points to an OBJECT_TYPE structure (see Fig. 3 ). This structure defines the object's class. So obviously all instances of the same class will refer to the same OBJECT_TYPE structure.
So the Type member of the OBJECT_HEADER may be used to identify an object in memory. This instantaneously raises some new questions: What are the proper values for process and thread objects? What factors do they depend on? And how can they be derived from a memory dump?
The kernel binary exports the names of global variables containing pointers to OBJECT_TYPE structures for processes and threads. Their names are PsProcessType and PsThreadType. An examiner now could locate the kernel in the memory dump. From there he could read the export table, find the symbols mentioned before and retrieve the type pointer values.
In a similar way the offsets could be determined and tabulated for known kernel versions. Again starting at the kernel's location in the dump file the examiner then would have to find out the version of the kernel and look up the proper offset from the table. Next he will have to add the offsets to the kernel's position and finally retrieve the type pointer values.
However, it would not be possible to speed up the process and tabulate the pointer values their self. Some experiments with Windows 2000 in a VMware environment have shown that the values remain constant between reboots of the same system configuration. Changing the amount of total memory available to the system affects the way Windows partitions the memory and as such causes the OBJECT_TYPE structures to be created at different addresses. The same might happen due to significant changes of the operating system's configuration, e.g. the installation of a driver.
It would also be possible to apply the concept of searching for those two OBJECT_TYPE structures, too. The rules are:
Rule 7 (Name. There is also a third pointer value which is of great importance in forensic examinations. Whenever an object, not necessarily a process or thread, is destroyed the kernel's nt!ObpFreeObject function sets its Type pointer to 0xbad0b0b0. The value remains constant over all kernel versions from Windows 2000 up to and including Server 2003. Now, that the type pointer values are known, it becomes possible to use them for identifying process and thread structures: 
DISPATCHER_HEADER
Processes and threads are synchronizable objects. As such their control structures EPROCESS and ETHREAD begin with a substructure known as DISPATCHER_HEADER (see Fig. 4 ).
The header contains a Type field which allows to differentiate between these object types easily. The type code for an object class is constant over the versions from Windows 2000 to Server 2003 (see Table 1 ).
For a given version of windows the Size is constant for all objects of a particular kind. It tells the object's size in units of DWORDs, that is 4 bytes. During the creation of a process (nt!KeInitializeProcess) or thread object (nt!KeInit Thread), the kernel initializes Type and Size with hard-coded values. These values will not change during the object's lifespan.
The meaning of Inserted and Absolute are unknown to the author. Based on the analysis of memory dumps obtained from several systems running different versions of Microsoft Windows from 2000 to Server 2003 both fields are always null. However, a code review of the kernel would be necessary to confirm this observation. At present it is not recommended to build a filter expression upon these two fields.
2.3.
Additional checks
Processes
A process is represented by an EPROCESS structure. This structure varies with the version of Windows. Key-values for the rules mentioned below are given in Table 2 .
The operating system provides any process with a virtual address space of its own. Some nested tables are used to map virtual addresses to the proper page frame in physical memory. DirectoryTableBase points to the beginning of the necessary structures. The Page Directory occupies a whole memory page; it is aligned at a page boundary.
Rule 11 PageDirectoryTable! ¼ 0 Rule 12 PageDirectoryTable % 4096 ¼ ¼ 0 Every process needs at least a single thread to do the work. Control structures of threads are kept in a doubly-linked list. EPROCESS contains two pointers into this list: ThreadListHead. Flink and ThreadListHead.Blink. The control blocks pointed at are located in kernel space. Therefore their virtual address must be above 0x7fffffff. 3 Rule 13 (ThreadListHead.Flink > 0x7fffffff) and (ThreadList Head.Blink > 0x7fffffff)
Rule 14 The structure must start with a DISPATCHER_HEADER of type 3 (process).
Rule 15 The structure must contain a Synchronization Event # 1 at the position designated in Table 2 . This rule does not apply to the Idle Process (PID 0).
Rule 16 The structure must contain Synchronization Events # 2 and 3 at the positions designated in Table 2. 
Threads
A thread is represented by an ETHREAD structure. Table 3 provides the offsets of variables used in the tests mentioned below.
The variable ThreadsProcess points to the EPROCESS structure of the owning process. This structure has to be located in kernel memory.
Rule 17 ThreadProcess > 0x7fffffff. See also footnote 3. This rule does not apply to the Idle thread (PID 0).
The StartAddress at which execution starts after the creation of the thread must be valid.
Rule 18 StartAddress !¼ 0 This rule does not apply to the Idle thread (PID 0).
Rule 19 The structure must start with a DISPATCHER_HEADER of type 6 (thread).
Rule 20 The structure must contain a notification timer and a semaphore at the positions designated in Table 3 .
Validation
The rule set described above is required to identify all processes and threads currently running. 3 For systems booted with the /3 GB switch the border between user and kernel space moves up to 0x0bfffffffff. d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 3 S ( 2 0 0 6 ) S 1 0 -S 1 6 expected to find traces of now defunct processes and threads.
For validation full memory dumps were obtained from clean installations of Microsoft Windows 2000 SP4, XP, XP SP1, XP SP2 and Windows Server 2003. For reference from these dumps a list of running processes and their associated threads was obtained through the Microsoft kernel debugger. Another list was compiled through the rule set as described above. The resulting lists were compared.
As it turns out the application of the rule set it did not miss a single process or thread shown by the debugger. As expected the rule set identified more objects than the debugger. Those turned out to be:
the Idle process and thread terminated processes and threads artifacts from a previous boot So the rule set did not falsely identify some random data as a process or thread.
Applications
As a proof-of-concept this set of rules was implemented in a Perl script named PTfinder, short for process and thread finder. A version based only on the DISPATCHER_HEADER and some additional checks was released in March 2006 at the DFN-CERT workshop (Schuster, 2006b 
Persistence of processes through a reboot
According to kntlist's readout of the KeBootTime kernel variable from the first DFRWS image the system was booted at 2005-06-05 00:32:27Z. This matches with the start time of most system processes. However, PTfinder reveals some processes which appear to have been started prior to that time:
According to the description of the DFRWS challenge the system then was rebooted and the second memory dump was obtained. Kntlist indicates this happened at 2005-06-05 15:00:56Z. Again this matches the start time of most system processes. And again PTfinder shows three processes which appear to have been started earlier:
These processes can also be found in the first image, at a matching file offset. Note that csrss.exe has at least survived one additional boot. Values printed in italics do not apply to the idle process. d i g i t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n 3 S ( 2 0 0 6 ) S 1 0 -S 1 6
While this might look odd at first, it is in accordance with Chow Chow et al. (2005) as well as with Farmer and Venema (2004, p. 182) :
Although most computers automatically zero main memory upon rebooting -many do not. This is generally independent of the operating system; for instance, motherboards fueled by Intel CPUs tend to have BIOS settings that clear main memory upon restart, but there is no requirement for this to happen.
Incident response
Interpreting lists of several hundred processes and threads could become a tedious task. To address this issue a simple visualization feature was added to PTfinder. Based on the PID and PPID as given in the EPROCESS structure a parent-child relationship between processes can be drawn. In a similar way this can be also done for threads and their owning process. This time the information is taken from PID and TID contained in the ETHREAD structure.
PTfinder can express these relations in a way suitably to be processed by the graph visualization software Graphviz (AT&T, 2005) . Graphviz can render the graph into several bitmap graphic formats or into a scalable vector graphic (SVG). The latter turned out to be very helpful when viewing large graphs. SVG files can be browsed with ZGRviewer (Pietriga, 2005) , which seamlessly integrates Graphviz.
This environment could help an incident responder or forensic examiner to walk down the hierarchy of processes and threads uncovered by PTfinder. This could unveil the root-cause of an incident soon. For example Fig. 5 shows a detail of the process hierarchy which was produced from the first of the DFRWS images. In the middle there are two processes spawned by lsass.exe, the Windows local security authority subsystem. LSASS is not expected to spawn processes, so this already is an alarming find. In addition the spawned processes are named after the well-known Metasploit exploit construction framework.
At least one of the two exploits obviously was successful and led to the execution of another process named UMGR32.EXE. This observation should suffice to justify any further investigation and incident response measures.
Malware analysis
The method described above does not require any conversions between virtual and physical addresses to be made. Hence it is not bound to special dump file formats. Beside raw dumps like the ones provided in the Memory Analysis Challenge it was successfully tested with Windows crash dumps (DMP) and VMware suspended sessions (VMSS). The latter was exploited several times to analyze encrypted malware. The malware was executed in a virtual machine. As soon as it had decrypted itself and started work, the VM was suspended. The VMware session file was then examined to locate EPROCESS structures of the malware. Finally the decrypted image was extracted from the memory dump.
The analysis of ETHREAD structures indicates which part of a binary was run and at what time. Depending on the usage of threads in a binary this could add to timeline information obtained from the last access time of the binary or an event log entry.
Conclusions and future work
The simple approach of searching for processes and threads described in this article works surprisingly well for all versions of Microsoft Windows from 2000 up to Windows Server 2003. First tests show that Microsoft Vista is going to reuse parts of the DISPATCHER_HEADER after object creation has been completed. This change in data usage indicates that some or all of the fields used for object identification might be meaningless for normal system operations. This could allow for some modified DKOM attacks targeting the bytes used to identify the objects. One should note here that if an attacker has acquired the privileges to change the contents of the nonpaged pool, he might also have got the rights to modify the in-memory code from which any sort of ''protection'' stems. The POOL_HEADER could provide a basis to search for other objects beside processes and threads. Pool tags are identifiable for all of the NT kernel objects like files, registry keys and devices. Yet it has to be checked whether unique tags exist to identify other kinds of helpful information. Building a reliable filter which will be based on the small POOL_HEADER is a challenging task. Work to analyze sample memory dumps and to formulate criteria is still in progress.
After all neither the method described in herein nor its implementation in PTfinder is meant to be a complete solution of the complex task of Windows memory analysis. Differences in the result sets obtained by searching the memory for objects and by enumerating the kernel's internal lists indicate some malicious or in another way ''interesting'' activity. Searching for objects is not meant to be a replacement for, but an improvement of list-walking tools like kntlist.
